Because of their interesting algebraic properties, several authors promote the use of generalized Reed-Solomon codes in cryptography. Niederreiter was the first to suggest an instantiation of his cryptosystem with them but Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that this choice is insecure. Wieschebrink proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which consists in concatenating a few random columns to a generator matrix of a secretly chosen generalized Reed-Solomon code. More recently, new schemes appeared which are the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Bogdanov and Lee, and a variation of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et al. which hides the generalized Reed-Solomon code by means of matrices of very low rank.
Introduction
The first cryptographic scheme using generalized Reed-Solomon codes was proposed in 1986 by Niederreiter [Nie86] but it was shown to be insecure in [SS92] . The attack recovers the underlying Reed-Solomon code allowing the decoding of any encrypted data. However during the past years there were several attempts to repair this scheme. In the present article, we focus on three modified McEliece schemes using generalized Reed Solomon codes. The first one was proposed by Wieschebrink [Wie06] and consists in choosing a generator matrix of a generalized Reed-Solomon code and adding to it a few random columns. It was advocated that this modification avoids the SidelnikovShestakov attack [SS92] . More recently, some of the nice algebraic properties of the Reed-Solomon codes were also used to devise the first public-key homomorphic encryption scheme [BL11] based on coding theory. The third one is another variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] proposed in [BBC + 11] which uses this time a generator matrix of a generalized Reed-Solomon but hides its structure differently than in the McEliece cryptosystem: instead of multiplying by a permutation matrix, the generator matrix is multiplied by a matrix whose inverse is of the form Π + R where Π is a sparse matrix with row density m 1 and R is a matrix of rank z 1. The key point of this modification is that the public code obtained with this method is not anymore a generalized ReedSolomon code and this seems to thwart the Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack completely. In the present article, we propose polynomial time attacks of these three schemes. Notice that for Baldi et al. ' s scheme [BBC + 11], our attack only considers the case when the matrix Π is a permutation matrix i.e. the case m = 1, and R is of rank z = 1. We focus on these specific cases because all the parameters proposed in [BBC + 11] were of this form. A good reason for these choices (m = 1 and z = 1) stems from the fact that the resulting schemes have the smallest public key sizes and the smallest deciphering complexity among this class of encryption schemes.
Contrarily to the Niederreiter's proposal [Nie86] based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes, the original McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] which uses Goppa codes, has withstood many key-recovery attacks and after more than thirty years now, it still belongs to the very few unbroken public-key cryptosystems. No significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of recovering the private key. For instance, the weak keys found in [Gib91, LS01] can be easily avoided. This fact has led to claim that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code does not disclose any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact that Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes. However, in [FGO + 11, FGUO + 13], an algorithm that manages to distinguish between a random code and a Goppa code has been introduced. This work, without undermining the security of [McE78] , prompts to wonder whether it would be possible to devise an attack based on such a distinguisher. It turns out [MCP12] that the distinguisher in [FGO + 11, FGUO + 13] has an equivalent but simpler description in terms of the componentwise product of codes. This notion was first put forward in coding theory to unify many different algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92, Köt92] . Recently, it was used in [MCMMP11a, MCMMP12b] to study the security of cryptosystems based on Algebraic-Geometric codes. Component-wise powers of codes are also studied in the context of secure multi-party computation (see for example [CCCX09, CCX11] ). This distinguisher is even more powerful in the case of Reed-Solomon codes than for Goppa codes. Indeed, whereas for Goppa codes it is only successful for rates close to 1, it can distinguish Reed-Solomon codes of any rate from random codes.
In the specific case of [BL11] , the underlying public code is a modified Reed-Solomon code obtained from the insertion of a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix defining it and in this case, the aforementioned distinguisher leads to an attack that is different from the one found independently by Brakerski in [Bra13] . More exactly, we present a key-recovery attack on the Bogdanov-Lee homomorphic scheme based on the version of our distinguisher presented in [MCP12] . Our attack runs in polynomial time and is efficient: it only amounts to calculate the ranks of certain matrices derived from the public key. In [BL11] the columns that define the zero submatrix are kept secret and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if one or several columns belong to L or not. It is constructed by considering the code generated by component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so-called "square code"). This operation is applied to punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the whole set indexing the columns. It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is directly related to the cardinality of the intersection of I with L. This gives a way to recover the full set L allowing the decryption of any ciphertext.
We also propose another cryptanalysis against the variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] proposed in [BBC + 11]. As explained above, the public code obtained with this method is not anymore a generalized Reed-Solomon code (GRS for short). On the other hand, it contains a very large secret GRS code. We present an attack that is based on a distinguisher which is able to identify elements of this secret code. This distinguisher is again derived from considerations about the dimension of component-wise products of codes. Once this secret code is obtained, it is then possible to completely recover the initial GRS code by using the square-code construction as in [Wie10] . We are then able to decode any ciphertext.
Finally, we also cryptanalyze the first variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on GRS codes [Wie06] . We show here how a refinement of our distinguisher permits to recover the random columns added to the generator matrix of the GRS code. Once these column positions are recovered, the Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack can be used on the non-random part of the generator matrix to completely break the scheme. It should also be pointed out that the properties of Reed-Solomon codes with respect to the (component-wise) product of codes have already been used to cryptanalyze a McEliece-like scheme [BL05] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10] . The use of this product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. Note also that our attack is not an adaptation of the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach [SS92] . Our approach is completely new: it illustrates how a distinguisher that detects an abnormal behavior can be used to recover a private key.
To demonstrate further the power of our approach, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and Shestakov's way [SS92] to fully recover the structure of a generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Our new attack uses the code product to build a decreasing chain of subcodes resulting to a code of very small dimension which shares the same support as the original secret generalized Reed-Solomon code and for which the structure is very simple to recover. This achievement is obtained by repeatedly solving linear systems. The resulting complexity is O(k 2 n 3 + k 3 n 2 ) operations in the underlying field. This attack is more complex than the original Sidelnikov and Shestakov but, because it does not rely on the computation of minimum codewords as in [SS92] , it might be applied to other families of codes such as Reed-Muller codes. This is in particular the case for wild Goppa codes [BLP10] as shown in the paper [COT14] where this technique was further developed and applied to wild Goppa codes defined over quadratic extensions. It gave for the first time a polynomial time attack on a McEliece cryptosystem based on non-binary Goppa codes. This recent result highlights the potential power of this method in cryptography.
Organization of the paper. In Section 1 we recall relevant notions from coding theory. In Section 2, we show that adjunction of random columns to a generalized Reed-Solomon codes as advocated in [Wie06] does not improve the security of McEliece-like cryptosystems based on ReedSolomon codes. In Section 3 we describe the cryptanalysis of the homomorphic cryptosystem introduced by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL11] . Section 4 describes the cryptosystem proposed in [BBC + 11] and explains the reasons why this scheme is insecure. In Section 5 we give another way to attack a scheme based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes, and lastly we conclude the paper.
Reed-Solomon Codes and the Square Code Construction
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the fundamental notion which is used in both attacks, namely the square code construction. Generalized Reed-Solomon codes (GRS in short) form a special case of codes with a very powerful low complexity decoding algorithm. It will be convenient to use the definition of these codes as evaluation codes.
Definition 1 (Generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be integers such that 1 k < n q where q is a power of a prime number. The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRS k (x, y) of dimension k is associated to a pair (x, y) ∈ F n q × F n q where x is an n-tuple of distinct elements of F q and y an n-tuple of arbitrary nonzero elements in F q . The code GRS k (x, y) is defined as:
Remark 1. Reed-Solomon codes correspond to the case where y i = 1 for all i.
The first work that suggested to use GRS codes in a public-key cryptosystem scheme was [Nie86] . But Sidelnikov and Shestakov discovered in [SS92] that this scheme is insecure. They namely showed that for any GRS code it is possible to recover in polynomial time a couple (x, y) which defines it. This is all that is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is therefore enough to break the Niederreiter cryptosystem suggested in [Nie86] or any McEliece type cryptosystem [McE78] that uses GRS codes instead of binary Goppa codes.
Definition 2 (Componentwise products). Given two vectors a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ∈ F n q , we denote by a ⋆ b the componentwise product
The star product should be distinguished from a more useful operation in coding theory, namely the canonical inner product:
Definition 3 (Product of codes & square code). Let A and B be two codes of length n. The star product code denoted by A ⋆ B of A and B is the vector space spanned by all products a ⋆ b where a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A then A ⋆ A is called the square code of A and is rather denoted by A 2 .
It is clear that A ⋆ B is also generated by the a i ⋆ b j 's where the a i 's and the b j 's form a basis of A and B respectively. Therefore, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Let A and B be two codes of length n, then × n matrix, which costs O(k 2 n 2 ) operations. This second step is dominant, which yields the result.
The importance of the square code construction will become clear when we compare the dimensions of square codes obtained through a structured code and random code and one major question is to know what one should expect. The following Proposition 6 shows that when applied to GRS codes, the dimension of the square code is roughly twice as large as the dimension of the underlying code. This fact has been already observed in [Wie10] in a cryptanalytic setting. A proof can also be found in [MCMMP12a, Proposition 10].
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of a GRS code as an evaluation code since the star product of two elements c = (y 1 p(x 1 ), . . . , y n p(x n )) and c ′ = (y 1 q(x 1 ), . . . , y n q(x n )) of GRS k (x, y) where p and q are two polynomials of degree at most k − 1 is of the form
where r is a polynomial of degree 2k−2. Conversely, any element of the form y 2 1 r(x 1 ), . . . , y 2 n r(x n ) where r is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to 2k −2 is a linear combination of star products of two elements of GRS k (x, y).
This proposition shows that the square code is only of dimension 2k − 1 when 2k − 1 n. This property can also be used in the case 2k −1 > n. To see this, consider the dual of the Reed-Solomon code, which is itself a Reed-Solomon code [MS86, Theorem 4, p.304] Proposition 7. GRS k (x, y) ⊥ = GRS n−k (x, y ′ ) where the length of GRS k (x, y) is n and y ′ is a certain element of F n q depending only on x and y.
This result is clearly different from what would be obtained if random linear codes were taken. Indeed, we expect that the square code when applied to a random linear code of dimension k should be a code of dimension of order min k+1 2 , n . Actually it can be shown by the proof technique of [FGO + 11, FGUO + 13] the following result (see also [MCP12] ).
Proposition 8 ([FGO + 11, FGUO + 13]). Let k and n be non-negative integers such that k = O(n 1/2 ) and consider a random (n − k) × (n − k) matrix R where each entry is independently and uniformly drawn from F q . Let R be the linear code defined by the generator matrix (ℑ k | R) where ℑ k is the k × k identity matrix.
For any ε such that 0 < ε < 1 and any α > 0, we have as k tends to +∞:
Therefore GRS k (x, y) can be distinguished from a random linear code of the same dimension by computing the dimension of the associated square codes. This phenomenon was already observed in [FGO + 11, FGUO + 13] for q-ary alternant codes (in particular Goppa codes) at very high rates. Let us note that even when 2k − 1 > n it is still possible to distinguish GRS codes from random codes by focusing on GRS k (x, y) ⊥ 2 . We have in this case:
which is a code of dimension 2n − 2k − 1.
The star product of codes has been used for the first time by Wieschebrink to cryptanalyze a McEliece-like scheme [BL05] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10] . The use of the star product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. In Wieschebrink's paper, the star product is used to identify for a certain subcode C of a GRS code GRS k (x, y) a possible pair (x, y). This is achieved by computing C 2 which turns out to be GRS k (x, y) 2 = GRS 2k−1 (x, y ⋆y). The Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm is then used on C 2 to recover a possible (x, y ⋆ y) pair to describe C 2 as a GRS code, and hence, a pair (x, y) is deduced for which C ⊂ GRS k (x, y).
Wieschebrink's Encryption Scheme
In [Wie06] Wieschebrink suggests a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on GRS codes whose purpose was to resist to the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack. The idea of this proposal is to use the generator matrix of a GRS code over F q in which a small number of randomly chosen columns are inserted. More precisely, let G be a generator matrix of a GRS code of length n and dimension k defined over F q . Let C 1 , . . . , C r be r column vectors in F k q drawn uniformly at random and let G ′ be the matrix obtained by concatenating G and the columns C 1 , . . . , C r . Choose S to be a k × k random invertible matrix and let Q be a an (n + r) × (n + r) permutation matrix. The public key of the scheme is
This cryptosystem can be cryptanalyzed if a description of the GRS code can be recovered from G pub . We give here a way to break this scheme in polynomial time which relies on two ingredients. The first one is given by
Proof. The first inequality comes from the fact that puncturing C ′2 at the r positions corresponding to the added random columns yields the code C 2 which is the square of an [n, k] GRS code and hence an [n, 2k − 1] GRS code. To prove the upper bound, let D be the code with generator matrix D obtained from G ′ by replacing the C i 's columns by all-zero columns and let D ′ be the code with generator matrix D ′ obtained by replacing in G ′ all columns which are not the C i 's by zero columns. Since
Therefore
where the last inclusion comes from the fact that D ⋆ D ′ is the zero subspace since D and D ′ have disjoint supports. The right-hand side inequality follows immediately from this, since dim D 2 = 2k − 1 and dim D ′2 r.
Remark 2. Actually the right-hand inequality of Lemma 9 is sharp and we have observed experimentally that if 2k − r − 1 < n then, we almost always get
For instance with values for q, n and r like those proposed in [Wie06] and choosing k = (n−r)/2−1 we observed with 1000 random instances that Equation (2) was always satisfied.
This will be useful to detect the positions which correspond to the C i 's. We call such positions the random positions whereas the other positions are referred to as the GRS positions. We use in this case a shortening trick which relies upon the following well-known lemma.
Lemma 10 ([HP03]). Shortening a GRS code of parameters [n, k] in ℓ k positions gives a GRS code with parameters
An attack easily follows from these facts. First of all, let us consider the case when 2k−1+r n, then consider C ′ i which is the punctured C ′ code at position i. Two cases can occur:
• i belongs to the random positions, then we expect that the dimension of C ′2 i is given by
since C ′ i is a GRS code of dimension k with r − 1 random columns inserted in its generator matrix hence dim C ′2 i = dim C ′2 + r − 1 = 2k − 2 + r with a high probability.
• i belongs to the GRS positions, then C ′ i is a GRS code of dimension k with r random columns inserted in its generator matrix so that
This gives a straightforward way to distinguish between the random positions and the GRS positions.
Consider now the case where 2k − 1 + r > n. The point is to shorten C ′ in a positions, then, thanks to Lemma 10, the same principle can be applied. Here a is chosen such that a < k and 2(k − a) − 1 + r < n − a so that a > 2k − 1 + r − n. Notice that these conditions on a can be met as soon as k > 2k + r − n that is to say n > k + r, which always holds true. Among these a positions, a 0 of them are random positions and a 1 def = a − a 0 are GRS positions. This yields an a 0 -codimensional subcode of a GRS code of parameters [n − a 1 , k − a 1 ] to which r − a 0 random positions have been added (or more precisely this yields a code with generator matrix given by the generator matrix of an a 0 -codimensional subcode of a GRS code of size (k − a 1 ) × (n − a 1 ) with r − a 0 random columns added to it). Let I a be a set of a positions and denote by C ′ Ia the code C ′ shortened in these positions. Using the previous results, we get that with high probability,
By this manner we get the value of 2a 1 + a 0 and since a = a 1 + a 0 is already known we can deduce the values of a 0 and a 1 . To identify which positions of C ′ Ia are random positions and which ones are GRS positions we just use the previous approach by shortening C ′ Ia in an additional position and checking whether or not the dimension decreases by one or two. This approach has been implemented in Magma and leads to identify easily all the random columns for the parameters suggested in [Wie06] . After identifying the random columns in the public generator matrix, it Wie06] with N = 100 trials.
just remains to puncture the public code at these positions and to apply the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack to completely break the scheme proposed in [Wie06] . The complexity of guessing the random columns in the public generator matrix is hence given by the complexity of computing the rank of n + r matrices of size
If, moreover, we assume that 2k − 1 + r > n as it is the case in [Wie06] then in a worst-case scenario we would guess only one position among the random ones so that we have to iterate at most r times the previous procedure. The complexity of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [SS92] is O k 3 + k 2 n and is negligible compared to the other calculations. Thus, the complexity of the attack is O k 2 r(n + r) 3 operations in the field F q . In Table 1 we gathered the running times of the attack implemented in Magma (V2.19-9) [BCP97] and obtained with an Intel R Xeon 2.90GHz.
3 Bogdanov-Lee Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Description of the scheme
The cryptosystem proposed by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL11] is a public-key homomorphic encryption scheme based on linear codes. It encrypts a plaintext m from F q into a ciphertext c that belongs to F n q where n is a given integer satisfying n < q. The key generation requires two non-negative integers ℓ, k such that 3ℓ < n and ℓ < k together with a subset L ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality 3ℓ. A set of n distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x n from F × q are generated at random. They serve to construct a k × n matrix G whose i-th column
where the symbol T stands for the transpose.The cryptosystem is defined as follows:
2. Public key. P def = SG where S is a k × k random invertible matrix over F q .
3. Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ F n q corresponding to m ∈ F q is obtained as c def = xP +m1+e where 1 ∈ F n q is the all-ones row vector, x is picked uniformly at random in F k q and e in F n q by choosing its components according to a certain distributionη.
4. Decryption. Solve the following linear system with unknowns y def = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F n q :
The plaintext is then m = n i=1 y i c i .
Let us explain here why the decryption algorithm outputs the correct plaintext when ℓ and n are chosen such that the entry e i at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. If this property on e holds, notice that the linear system (3) has 3ℓ unknowns and ℓ + 1 equations and since it is by construction of rank ℓ + 1, it always admits at least one solution. Then observe that
The decryption algorithm will output the correct plaintext when ℓ and n are chosen such that the entry e i at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. The distributionη which is used to draw at random the coordinates of e is chosen such that this property holds with very large probability. More precisely, the parameters k, q, ℓ and the noise distributionη are chosen such that q = Ω 2 n α , k = Θ n 1−α/8 , ℓ = Θ n α/4 and the noise distributionη is the q-ary symmetric channel with noise rate 1 η = Θ 1/n 1−α/4 where α ∈ [0, 
An efficient key-recovery attack
We present here an attack that is different from Brakerski's one [Bra13] . Ours consists in first recovering the secret set L and from here, one finds directly a suitable vector y by solving the system P y T = 0,
Indeed, requiring that P y T = 0 is equivalent to the equation Gy T = 0 since, by definition, P = SG and since S is invertible. Therefore, (4) is equivalent to the "secret" system (3). An attacker may therefore recover m without even knowing G just by outputting i y i c i for any solution y of (4).
In what follows, we will explain how L can be recovered from P in polynomial time.
Our attack which recovers L relies heavily on the fact that the public matrix may be viewed as a generator matrix of a code C which is quite close to a generalized Reed-Solomon code (or to a Reed-Solomon code if a row consisting only of 1's is added to it). Notice that any punctured version of the code has also this property (a punctured code consists in keeping only a fixed subset of positions in a codeword). More precisely, let us introduce Definition 11. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality |I|, the restriction of a code A of length n is the subset of
The results about the unusual dimension of the square of a Reed-Solomon codes which are given in Section 1 prompt us to study the dimension of the square code C 2 or more generally the dimension of C 2 I . When I contains no positions in L, then C I is nothing but a generalized Reed-Solomon code and we expect for C 2 a dimension of 2k − 1 when |I| is larger than 2k − 1. On the other hand, when there are positions in I which also belong to L we expect the dimension to become bigger and the dimension of C 2 to behave as an increasing function of |I ∩ L|. This is exactly what happens as shown in the proposition below. 
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A. An attacker can exploit this proposition to mount a distinguisher that recognizes whether a given position belongs to the secret set L. At first a set I which satisfies with high probability the assumptions of Proposition 12 is randomly chosen. Take for instance |I| = 3k. Then k I def = dim(C 2 I ) is computed. Next, one element x is removed from I to get a new set I ′ and k I ′ = dim(C 2 I ′ ) is computed. The only two possible cases are either x / ∈ L then k I ′ = k I or x ∈ L and then k I ′ = k I − 1. By repeating this procedure, the whole set J = I ∩ L is easily recovered. The next step now is to find all the elements of L that are not in I. One solution is to exchange one element in I \ J by another element in {1, . . . , n} \ I and compare the values of k I . If it increases, it means that the new element belongs to L. At the end of this procedure the set L is totally recovered. This probabilistic algorithm is obviously of polynomial time complexity and breaks completely the homomorphic scheme suggested in [BL11] .
Inherent weakness of the scheme
The purpose of this section is to explain why the homomorphic scheme of [BL11] leads in a natural way to define codes whose square code has an abnormal low dimension. This property which seems inherent to the scheme implies that there is little hope to propose a reparation. This fact was also observed in [Bra13] . The point of [BL11] is to define a code which is homomorphic for addition over F q (all linear codes do the job here) but also protohomorphic for the multiplication over F q [BL11, Claim 3.5]. This property holds for their scheme, because there is a solution y of (3) which satisfies for two ciphertexts c and c ′ in F n q corresponding respectively to the plaintexts m and m ′ in F q :
Recall that c and c ′ are given by
where e and e ′ are error vectors whose support does not intersect L. We also know that y satisfies:
3. y i = 0 if i / ∈ L with P and G related by a multiplication of an invertible matrix S, i.e. P = SG.
We deduce from this
The terms y e T ⋆ (P T x ′T + m ′ 1 T + e ′T ) and y (P T x T + m1 T ) ⋆ e ′T are equal to zero because the support of y is contained in L and e T ⋆ (
′T are equal to 0 from Condition (i) on y given above. Therefore in order to ensure (6) we need that
has a non zero solution whose support is contained in L. Let C be the code with generating matrix P , that is the set of elements of the form xP . Notice that the set of solutions of (9) is precisely the dual of C 2 . This implies that C 2 should not be the whole space F n q . This is quite unusual as explained in Section 1 when the dimension k of C satisfies k ≫ n 1/2 . Furthermore, since we are interested in solutions of (9) whose support is contained in L we actually need that the dual of C 2 L is non empty which is even more abnormal since C L is a code of length 3ℓ and dimension ℓ. In other words, the Bogdanov and Lee homomorphic scheme leads in a natural way to choose codes C which have a non-random behavior with respect to the dimension of the square product.
BBCRS Cryptosystem

Description of the scheme
The cryptosystem denoted by BBCRS proposed by Baldi et al. in [BBC + 11] is a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] which replaces the permutation matrix used to hide the secret generator matrix by one of the form Π + R where Π is a sum of m permutation matrices and R is a matrix of rank z. Notice that the case m = 1 and z = 0 corresponds to the McEliece cryptosystem based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes (which was broken in [SS92] ). Here we focus on the case where z = 1, and Π is a single permutation matrix which concerns all the parameters suggested in Section 5 of [BBC + 11]. There is actually a good reason why the case m = 1, z = 1 stands out here: m = 1 is precisely the case which gives by far the smallest key sizes when the parameters are chosen so as to avoid generic decoding techniques aiming at recovering the message. Moreover, there is a big prize coming with increasing the value of z. Basically the deciphering time is proportional to q z T where q is the size of the field over which the public code is defined (it is typically of the same order as the length n of the code) and T is the decoding time of the GRS code used in this scheme. Roughly speaking, deciphering is about n z more complex than in a McEliece cryptosystem based on GRS codes. It was assumed in [BBC + 11] that the gain in the public key size of the scheme would outweigh the big loss in deciphering time. For this reason it is certainly questionable whether schemes with z 2 could be really practical. After the attack, which is detailed in this section, appeared on www.arXiv.org in [GOT12] , a new version of [BBC + 11] came out in [BBC + 12] where a slight generalization of Π is considered, namely Π is just sparse now and the actual parameters proposed in [BBC + 12] suggest now matrices Π with a row/column weight between 1 and 2. The attack proposed here does not apply directly to these new parameters anymore. It raises the issue whether a generalization of our attack would be able to break the new parameters, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
From the authors' point of view, the idea underlying these new transformations was they would allow to use families of codes that were shown insecure in the original McEliece cryptosystem. In particular, it would become possible to use GRS codes in this new framework. The scheme can be summarized as follows.
Secret key.
• G sec is a generator matrix of a GRS code of length n and dimension k over F q ,
• Q def = Π + R where Π is an n × n permutation matrix;
• R is a rank-one matrix over F q such that Q is invertible. In other words there exist
• S is a k × k random invertible matrix over F q .
Public key. G pub
Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ F n q of a plaintext m ∈ F k q is obtained by drawing at random e in F n q of weight less than or equal to n−k 2 and computing c def = mG pub + e.
Decryption. It consists in performing the three following steps:
1. Guessing the value of eR; 2. Calculating c ′ def = cQ − eR = mS −1 G sec + eQ − eR = mS −1 G sec + eΠ and using the decoding algorithm of the GRS code to recover mS −1 from the knowledge of c ′ ;
3. Multiplying the result of the decoding by S to recover m.
The first step of the decryption, that is guessing the value eR, boils down to trying q elements (in the worst case) since eR = eα T β = γβ where γ is an element of F q .
Key-recovery attack when 2k + 2 < n
We define C sec and C pub to be the codes generated by the matrices G sec and G pub respectively. We denote by n the length of these codes and by k their dimension. We assume in this subsection that 2k + 2 < n (10)
The case of rates larger than 1/2 will be treated in Subsection 4.3. As explained in Subsection 4.1, C sec is a GRS code. It will be convenient to bring in the code
This code C , being a permutation of a GRS code, is itself a GRS code. So there are elements x and y in F n q such that C = GRS k (x, y). There is a simple relation between C pub and C as explained by Lemma 13 below.
First, notice that, since R has rank 1, then so does RΠ −1 . Hence there exist a and b in F n q such that: 
Proof. Appendix B.
Remark 3. Notice that the definition of λ makes sense if and only of a · b = −1. This actually holds since Q is assumed to be invertible (See Lemmas 24 and 25 in Appendix B).
From now on, we make the assumption that
If this is not the case then C pub = C = GRS k (x, y) and there is a straightforward attack by applying the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92] or the alternative attack we propose in Section 4. It finds (x ′ , y ′ ) that expresses C pub as GRS k (x ′ , y ′ ). Our attack relies on identifying a code of dimension k − 1 that is both a subcode of C pub and the GRS code C . It consists more precisely of codewords p + (p · λ)a with p in C such that p · λ = 0. This particular code which is denoted by C λ ⊥ is therefore:
where < λ > denotes the vector space spanned by λ. It is a subspace of C pub of codimension 1 if Assumption (14) holds. Here is an inclusion diagram for the involved codes.
Summary of the attack. Before describing it in depth, let us give the main steps of the attack.
Step 1. Compute a basis of C λ ⊥ using distinguisher-based methods. See § 4.2.1 for further details.
Step 2. Use Wieschebrink's method [Wie10] , which asserts that: C 2 λ ⊥ = C 2 to recover the structure of C 2 and then that of C . See § 4.2.2.
Step 3. Compute a pair (a 0 , λ 0 ) called a valid pair (Definition 17), which will have similar properties than the pair (a, λ) (see (12) and Lemma 13 for the definitions of a and λ). See § 4.2.3.
Step 4. Thanks to the valid pair, one can decrypt any ciphered message. See § 4.2.4.
Computing a basis of C λ ⊥
The inclusion relations described in the diagram (16) strongly suggest that C 2 pub should have an unusual low dimension since C 2 has dimension 2k − 1 by Proposition 6. More exactly we have the following result. Remark 4. Experimentally it has been observed that the upper-bound is sharp. Indeed, the dimension of C 2 pub has always been found to be equal to 3k − 1 in all our experiments when choosing randomly the codes and Q with parameters of [BBC + 11] of Example 1 and 2. In our tests we randomly picked 1000 GRS codes with rate 1/2, apply random transformations Q −1 on them.
The second observation is that when a basis g 1 , . . . , g k of C pub is chosen together with l other random elements z 1 , . . . , z l ∈ C pub , then we may expect that the dimension of the vector space generated by all products z i ⋆ g j with i in {1, . . . , l} and j in {1, . . . , k} is the dimension of the full space C 2 pub when l 3. This is indeed the case when l 4 but it is not true for l = 3 since we have the following result.
Proposition 15. Let B be the linear space spanned by z i ⋆ g j | 1 i 3 and 1 j k then it holds: dim (B) 3k − 3.
A proof of this phenomenon is given in Appendix C. Experimentally, it turns out that almost always this upper-bound is tight and the dimension is generally 3k − 3. But if we assume now that z 1 , z 2 , z 3 all belong to C λ ⊥ , which happens with probability 1 q 3 since C λ ⊥ is a subspace of C pub of codimension 1 (at least when (14) holds), then the vectors z i ⋆ g j generate a subspace with a much smaller dimension.
Proposition 16. If z i is in C λ
⊥ for i in {1, 2, 3} then for all j in {1, . . . , k}:
and if B is the linear code spanned by z i ⋆ g j | 1 i 3 and 1 j k then
Proof. Assume that the z i 's all belong to C λ ⊥ . For every g j there exists p j in C such that g j = p j + λ · p j a. We obtain now
This proves the first part of the proposition, the second part follows immediately from the first part since it implies that the dimension of the vector space generated by the z i ⋆ g j 's is upperbounded by the sum of the dimension of C 2 (that is 2k − 1) and the dimension of the vector space spanned by the z i ⋆ a's (which is at most 3).
The upper-bound given in (18) on the dimension follows immediately from (17). This leads to Algorithm 1 which computes a basis of C λ ⊥ . It is essential that the condition in (10) holds in order to distinguish the case when the dimension is less than or equal to 2k + 2 from higher dimensions. The first phase of the attack, namely finding a suitable triple z 1 , z 2 , z 3 runs in expected time
for 1 i 3 do
3:
Randomly choose z i in C pub 4: end for
5:
B ← < z i ⋆ g j | 1 i 3 and 1 j k > 6: until dim(B) 2k + 2 and dim (< z 1 , z 2 , z 3 >) = 3 7: L ← {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 } 8: s ← 4 9: while s k − 1 do 10:
Randomly choose z s in C pub
12:
T ← < z i ⋆ g j | i ∈ {1, 2, s} and 1 j k > 13:
L ← L ∪ {z s }
15:
s ← s + 1 16: end while 17: return L; O q 3 k 2 n because each test in the repeat loop 1 has a chance of 1 q 3 to succeed. Indeed, C λ ⊥ is of codimension 1 in C pub and therefore a fraction 1 q of elements of C pub belongs to C λ ⊥ . Once z 1 , z 2 , z 3 are found, getting any other element of C λ ⊥ is easy. Indeed, take a random element z ∈ C pub and use the same test to check whether the triple z 1 , z 2 , z is in C λ ⊥ . Since z 1 , z 2 ∈ C λ ⊥ the probability of success is 1 q and hence z can be found in O(q) tests. The whole algorithm runs in expected time O q 3 k 2 n + O qk 3 n = O q 3 k 2 n since k < n q, hence the first phase of the attack is dominant in the complexity.
Recovering the structure of C
Once C λ ⊥ is recovered, it still remains to recover the secret code and a. The problem at hand can be formulated like this: we know a very large subcode, namely C λ ⊥ , of a GRS code that we want to recover. This is exactly the problem which was solved in [Wie10] . In our case this amounts to compute C 2 λ ⊥ which turns out to be equal to GRS 2k−1 (x, y ⋆ y) (see [MCMMP11b, MCMMP12a] for more details). It suffices to use the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92] or the algorithm described in Section 5 to compute a pair (x, y ⋆ y) describing C 2 λ ⊥ as a GRS code. From this, we deduce a pair (x, y) defining the secret code C as a GRS code.
4.2.3
Deriving a and λ from C and C λ ⊥ At this step of the attack let us summarize what has been done. We have been able to compute the codes C and C λ ⊥ defined in (11) and (15) respectively. We recall the inclusion diagram.
C pub + C
Codim1 t t t t t t t t t
In addition, we know that the code C and C pub are related by the map
To finish the attack, we need to find a pair (a 0 , λ 0 ) ∈ F n q × F n q such that the map ψ a 0 ,λ 0 induces an isomorphism from C to C pub . This motivates the following definition.
Moreover, if (a) holds then the inclusion in (b) is an equality since both codes have the same dimension.
First, we choose u ∈ C \ C λ ⊥ and v ∈ C pub \ C λ ⊥ . Since C λ ⊥ has codimension 1 in C , we have
A valid pair (a 0 , λ 0 ) can be found easily using the two following elementary lemmas.
Hence, from (21), we would have λ 0 ∈ C ⊥ which yields a contradiction. The other non-equality is proved by the very same manner.
Lemma 19. For all λ 0 ∈ C ⊥ λ ⊥ and for all x ∈ F n q , we have
Proof. Since u ∈ C , the implication (=⇒) is obvious. Conversely, assume that ψ λ 0 ,x (u) ∈ C pub . Then, from (21), to show the result there remains to show that
Procedure to recover a valid pair. Before starting, recall that we fixed vectors u ∈ C \ C λ ⊥ and v ∈ C pub \ C λ ⊥ so that (21) holds.
Step
is nonempty since both C ⊥ and C ⊥ pub have codimension 1 in C ⊥ λ ⊥ and even over a finite field, no vector space of dimension 1 is a union of two vector subspaces of codimension 1.
Step 2. Set
It is well-defined thanks to Lemma 18.
We claim that the pair (a 0 , λ 0 ) is valid. Indeed, we have
Moreover, λ 0 · v = 0 thanks to Lemma 18, and hence a 0 · λ 0 = −1. Thus, the pair satisfies Condition (a) of Definition 17.
To show that Condition (b) is satisfied too, Lemma 19 asserts that we only need to prove that ψ a 0 ,λ 0 (u) ∈ C pub which is true since an elementary computation yields
which is in C pub by construction.
Decryption of any ciphertext
We have found a valid pair (Definition 17) (a 0 , λ 0 ). We want to decode the vector z def = c + e where e is an error of a certain Hamming weight which can be corrected by the decoding algorithm chosen for C and c is an element of the public code. From Remark 5 page 16, we know that there exists
We compute z(α) def = z + αa 0 for all elements α in F q . One of these elements α is equal to −λ 0 · p and we obtain z(α) = p + e in this case. Decoding z(α) in C will reveal p and this gives c by using Equation (22).
Extending the attack for rates larger than 1 2
The codes suggested in [BBC + 11, §5.1.1, §5.1.2] are all of rate significantly larger than 1 2 , for instance Example 1 p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 306, dimension 232 over F 307 , whereas Example 2. p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 511, dimension 387 over F 512 . The attack suggested in the previous subsection only applies to rates smaller than 1 2 . There is a simple way to adapt the previous attack for this case by considering the dual C ⊥ pub of the public code. Note that by Proposition 7, there exists y ′ in F n q for which we have C ⊥ = GRS n−k (x, y ′ ). Moreover, C ⊥ pub displays a similar structure as C pub .
Lemma 20. For any c from C ⊥ pub there exists an element p in C ⊥ such that:
Proof. The key to Lemma 20 is the fact that, from (32), we have C ⊥ pub = C ⊥ P T . Indeed C pub = C P −1 and therefore for any element c of C pub there exists an element p of C such that c = pP −1 . Observe now that every element c ′ in C ⊥ pub satisfies 0 = c · c
If we set c ′ = p ′ P T it results p · p ′ = 0, therefore C ⊥ pub = C ⊥ P T . This discussion implies that there exists an element p ′ in C ⊥ such that:
It implies that the whole approach of the previous subsection can be carried out over C ⊥ pub . It allows to recover the secret code C ⊥ and therefore also C . This attack needs that 2(n − k) + 2 < n, that is 2k > n + 2. In summary, there is an attack as soon as k is outside a narrow interval around n/2 which is [
McEliece Variants Based on GRS codes
In this section, we will give an alternative attack of [SS92] against any McEliece-like cryptosystem based on GRS codes. This attack runs in polynomial time and makes possible the recovery of the structure of any GRS code. From the computational point of view, this attack is less efficient than that of Sidelnikov and Shestakov because of the cost of the computation of squares or star products of codes. Indeed, the complexity of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack is O k 3 + k 2 n whereas our attack runs in O(k 2 n 3 + k 3 n 2 ) operations. However, our approach remains of interest since it does not require as a first step the computation of minimum weight codewords. For this reason, it could provide interesting generalizations. Indeed, it should be noticed that certain key recovery attacks on other algebraic codes such as [MS07] on Reed-Muller codes and [FM08] on hyperelliptic algebraic geometry codes are built in the same spirit as Sidelnikov and Shestakov's attack [SS92] and in particular have as a first step, the computation of minimum weight codewords. This computation is subexponential for Reed-Muller codes and exponential in the genus of the curve for algebraic geometry codes, which limits the attack [FM08] to codes from curves with very low genus. On the other hand, our method might be generalized to such codes and provides alternative and more computationally efficient attacks.
Context and notation
Assume that it has dimension k n/2 (if not, then one can work with the dual code). First assume that the two first positions, i.e. the two first entries of a are 0 and 1. Such an assumption makes sense since every GRS code is permutation equivalent to a code satisfying this condition. This is a consequence of the 3-transitivity of the action of the projective linear group PGL(2, F q ) on the points of the projective line. The main step of our attack is to compute some codes among C (i, j). Notice that these codes are also GRS codes.
Computing some subcodes
Clearly, the computation of a generator matrix of C (0, 1), C (1, 0) and C (1, 1) is straightforward since it reduces to Gaussian elimination. These codes are nothing but shortenings of C . The main tool of our attack is the following result.
Theorem 21. Assume that k n/2. For all 1 i k − 2 and all j such that i + j k − 2, we have
Proof. We prove the first identity, the second is obtained easily by symmetry. For all pair of nonnegative integers (i, j), set
This space has dimension k − i − j and is related to our GRS codes by
where for all P ∈ F q [x], we denote by P (a) the word P (a) def = (P (a 1 ), . . . , P (a n )). Clearly, we have:
and it is also readily checked that
This yields the result.
From the previous result, as long as C (i, j) 2 = F n q , which holds for k n/2, given generator matrices of C (i, j) and C (i − 1, j), one can recover a basis of C (i + 1, j) by solving a simple linear system. Indeed, deciding whether an element c ∈ C (i, j) is actually in C (i + 1, j) reduces to solve:
It is worthwhile noting that (24) is not satisfied for a c ∈ C (i, j) that does not belong to C (i + 1, j).
Complexity. To solve (24), we first need to compute a row-echelon basis for C (i, j) 2 . From Proposition 5, this costs O(k 2 n 2 ). From this basis, we compute easily a basis for C (i, j) 2 ⊥ . The equations of the linear system (24) have the form h ⋆ d where h ∈ C (i − 1, j) and d ∈ (C (i, j) 2 ) ⊥ . Thus, solving the system consists in computing all these equations whose number is (dim
Hence their computation costs O(kn(n − 2k)), then we solve a linear system which costs O(n 2 k(n − 2k)), or roughly speaking O(n 3 k). Therefore, the complexity of solving (24) is O(k 2 n 2 + k 3 n). This computation should be iterated k times, which yields O(k 2 n 3 + k 3 n 2 ) operations.
Description of the attack
The attack summarizes as follows. We assume that the dimension of the GRS code is less than n/2, if not one can apply the attack on its dual.
Step 1. Compute a basis of C (k − 1, 0), i.e. compute a nonzero vector c of this 1-dimensional space. The corresponding vector comes from the evaluation of a polynomial of the form λx k−1 for some λ ∈ F × q . More precisely, we get the vector λ(a k−1 ⋆ b). Then, compute a basis of C (k − 2, 1). The corresponding vector c ′ is of the form µa k−2 ⋆ (a − 1) ⋆ b for µ ∈ F × q and where 1 def = (1, . . . , 1).
Step 2. The vectors c and c ′ have no zero position but the two first ones. Thus, after puncturing at the two first positions the quotient c ′ /c makes sense and corresponds to the evaluation of the fraction ν(x − 1)/x for some ν ∈ F × q (i.e. is ν(a − 1)/a, which makes sense after a suitable puncturing).
It is worth noting that compared to the vectors c and c ′ , the vector c ′ /c corresponds to the exact evaluation of ν(x − 1)/x at some elements of F q \ {0, 1} since the entries of b are cancelled by the quotient.
Step 3. Up to now, we only made two arbitrary choices by fixing the position of 0 and 1. Because of the 3-transitivity of PGL(2, F q ), one can make a third arbitrary choice. Thus, without loss of generality, one can assume that ν = 1. Now, notice that the map x → (x − 1)/x is a bijection from F q \ {0, 1} to itself with reciprocal map y → 1/(1 − y).
Thus, by applying the map y → 1/(1 − y) to the entries of the vector c ′ /c we get the corresponding positions, i.e. the vector a.
Step 4. Now, comparing the vector c with the vector a k , we get b up to multiplication by an element α ∈ F × q , which does not matter since
Remark 6. Roughly speaking, this attack can be regarded as a "local version" of Sidelnikov and Shestakov's attack. Indeed, Sidelnikov and Shestakov's attack consist in finding two codewords of minimum weight whose support differ only in two positions. This corresponds to shorten the code at k − 2 positions and then recover the structure of the code using two codewords of this shortened code. Here, we shorten only in a single position but consider polynomials vanishing with a high multiplicity.
Conclusion
In this paper we use directly the fact that the square of codes which are close enough to GRS codes have an abnormally small dimension. When applied to several public-key encryption schemes [Nie86, Wie06, BBC + 11, BL11], it always results in an efficient key-recovery attack. More precisely, we show that:
• Computing the dimensions of the square of various subcodes of the public code permits to detect random columns in the generator matrix of the public code of the Wieschebrink cryptosystem [Wie06],
• Computing the dimensions of the square of various punctured versions of the public code in the Bogdanov-Lee cryptosystem [BL11] enables to retrieve the Reed-Solomon part of the public code,
• In the case of the scheme [BBC + 11], it is possible to identify a certain subcode that is both included in a GRS code and the public code,
• In the case of a McEliece-like cryptosystem based on a GRS code [Nie86] , it enables to get a full filtration by means of GRS subcodes, so that the structure of the public code as a GRS code is recovered.
It should be mentioned that the idea of using product codes and a suitable filtration was used recently in [COT14] to cryptanalyze successfully in polynomial time the wild McEliece cryptosystems proposed in [BLP10] that were defined over a quadratic extension.
Note that the component-wise product of codes which is central to our approach has been applied recently in [CB13] to attack the McEliece variant based on Reed-Muller codes proposed in [Sid94] . The squares of these codes have also an abnormal dimension in this case. This yields in some cases a polynomial time attack [CB13] and in general it improves upon the subexponential attack of [MS07] . It would be interesting to study whether an attack similar to our filtration attack which was effective against GRS codes could be carried out for Reed-Muller codes to yield a polynomial time attack on all instances of this cryptosystem. However, the most challenging task would be to attack the original McEliece cryptosystem with similar tools (at least for a range of parameters) since duals of Goppa codes also have, in a limited way, square codes with low dimensions. 2
A Proof of Proposition 12
Set a def = |I| − |J| and b def = |I|. After a suitable permutation of the support and the indexes of the x j 's, the code C I has a generator matrix of the form
We define the maps
We have the two following obvious lemmas. Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the restriction of Φ I\J is injective. It is an elementary consequence of polynomial interpolation, since a = |I| − |J| is assumed to be be larger than 2k.
Lemma 23. For all P, Q ∈ F q [x], we have:
Clearly, we have C I = Φ I < x, . . . , x ℓ > ⊕ Φ I\J < x ℓ+1 , . . . , x k > .
Using (25), (26) and (27), we get C 2 I = Φ I < x, . . . , x ℓ > 2 + Φ I\J < x ℓ+1 , . . . , x k > 2 + Φ I < x, . . . , x ℓ > ⋆ Φ I\J < x ℓ+1 , . . . , x k > = Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > + Φ I\J < x 2ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > + Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x k+ℓ > = Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > + Φ I\J < x 2ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > + < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x k+ℓ > Since, by assumption, ℓ < k, we have < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x k+ℓ > + < x 2ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > = < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > Therefore, C 2 I = Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > + Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > .
Lemma 22 entails dim Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > = 2ℓ − 1, and dim Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > = 2k − ℓ − 1.
To conclude the proof, we need to compute the dimension of the intersection of these spaces. For this purpose, set
An element of Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > ∩Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > is an element of Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > which vanishes on the |J| = b−a last positions: it is an element of Φ I < x 2 R(x), . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R(x) > . Thus, Φ I < x 2 , . . . , x 2ℓ > ∩ Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > = Φ I < x 2 R, . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R > ∩ Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > = Φ I\J < x 2 R, . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R > ∩ Φ I\J < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > = Φ I\J < x 2 R, . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R > ∩ < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > .
The last equality is also a consequence of Lemma 22 since the direct image of an intersection by an injective map is the intersection of the direct images. Since all the x i 's are nonzero, the polynomials x ℓ+2 and R are prime to each other, this yields < x 2 R, . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R > ∩ < x ℓ+2 , . . . , x 2k > =< x ℓ+2 R, . . . , x 2ℓ−|J| R > . 
B Proof of Lemma 13
Recall that R has rank 1, then so does RΠ −1 and there exist a and b in F n q such that RΠ −1 = b T a.
We first need the following lemmas
Lemma 24. The matrix Q is invertible if and only if P is.
Proof. We have Q = Π + R = (ℑ + RΠ −1 )Π = P Π, which yields the proof.
Lemma 25. The matrix P is invertible if and only if a · b = −1. In addition, if it is invertible, then
Proof. First, assume that a · b = −1. Then,
To conclude the "only if" part of the proof, there remains to prove that P is non invertible for a · b = −1. Assume a · b = −1, then
Thus, in this situation, P is a projection distinct from ℑ and hence is non invertible.
Proof of Lemma 13. Let c be an element of C pub . Since C sec = C pub Q = C pub (Π + R) = C pub (ℑ + RΠ −1 )Π.
We obtain C = C sec Π −1 = C pub P where
Therefore C pub = (C sec Π −1 )P −1 = C P −1 .
From this, we obtain that there exists p in C such that c = pP −1 . Thus, from Lemma 25 we know that P −1 = ℑ − 1 1+a·b b T a = ℑ + λ T a, which enables to write:
Corollary 26. Given u, v ∈ F n q the map p → p + (u · p)v is an automorphism of F n q if and only if u · v = −1.
C Proof of Proposition 15
This follows immediately from the fact that we can express z i in terms of the g j 's, say
We observe now that there exist three relations between the z i ⋆ g j 's:
It remains to prove that the three obtained identities relating the z i ⋆ g j 's are independent under some conditions on the z i 's. Actually, these relations are independent if and only if the z i 's generate a space of dimension larger than or equal to 2. Indeed, sort the z 1 ⋆ g j 's as z 1 ⋆ g 1 , . . . , z 1 ⋆ g k , z 2 ⋆ g 1 , . . . , z 2 ⋆ g k , z 3 ⋆ g 1 , . . . , z 3 ⋆ g k . Then the system defined by Equations (33) to (35) Then, A has rank strictly less than 3 if there exists a vector u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) such that uA = 0 which is equivalent to the system    u 1 z 2 + u 2 z 3 = 0 −u 1 z 1 − u 3 z 3 = 0 −u 2 z 1 + u 3 z 2 = 0 and such a system has a nonzero solution u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) if and only if the z i 's are pairwise collinear i.e. generate a subspace of dimension lower than or equal to 1.
